Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) is a pivotal vehicular application that would allow transportation field to achieve its goals of increased traffic throughput and roadway capacity. This application is of paramount interest to the vehicular technology community with a large body of literature dedicated to research within different aspects of CACC, including but not limited to security with CACC. Of all available literature, the overwhelming focus in on CACC utilizing vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication. In this work, we assert that a qualitative increase in vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) and infrastructure-to-vehicle (I2V) involvement has the potential to add greater value to CACC. In this study, we developed a strategy for detection of a denial-ofservice (DoS) attack on a CACC platoon where the system edge in the vehicular network plays a central role in attack detection. The proposed security strategy is substantiated with a simulationbased evaluation using the ns-3 discrete event network simulator. Empirical evidence obtained through simulation-based results illustrate successful detection of the DoS attack at four different levels of attack severity using this security strategy. 
INTRODUCTION
Connected vehicles technology (CVT) is an umbrella term referring to any technology that allows vehicles to communicate with each other and with supporting roadside infrastructure to meet objectives of road safety, traffic condition improvement, and environmental benefits (1) . Environments within CVT include vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), and infrastructureto-vehicle (I2V). The utility of each of these environments is dependent on factors like vehicular application requirements and the physical domain (2) . Physical domain can be classified by the roadway class in which the connected vehicles are required to operate. V2I communication can especially provide connected vehicles in the arterial domain with valuable traffic insight that helps them form optimal driving decisions. An advanced vehicular network is of paramount importance to the quality of V2I communication. A vehicular network consists of system edges that can communicate with the connected vehicles and supporting computational and back-end nodes required for application specific computation-intensive activities. While short-range V2V communication can be supported by DSRC, the vehicular network designed with V2I in mind should be able to support longer-range wireless technologies such as LTE and Wi-Fi (3). The information required by connected vehicles to operate competently is time-sensitive with delayed or incorrect information resulting in catastrophic outcomes (4) . Thus, it is important for the vehicular network to ensure conditions like high reliability and low latency. The network design should also include strategies for prevention against security attacks.
Over the past years, applications like Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) catering to goals of safety, mobility, and environmental impact have been designed and evaluated. CACC essentially builds on pre-existing Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) technology by adding a cooperative element provided through V2V or V2I/I2V communication (5) . CACC is motivated by the goal of improving road capacity and throughput, and reducing the environmental impact of vehicles by increasing fuel efficiency. In V2V CACC, each vehicle uses its own speed and acceleration, the speed and acceleration of its immediate predecessor, and the distance between itself and the immediate predecessor to determine a driving speed that maintains the vehicle following distance desired by CACC. This information can be made available to each vehicle using V2V communication and the presence of on-board sensors. While CACC can use either a constant time gap (CTG) or a constant distance gap (CDG) strategy to determine the car following distance, CTG is generally considered more stable. Recent research within CACC has successfully demonstrated better roadway throughput (6) and fuel efficiency (7) .
A dominant portion of the body of work that exists on CACC, especially in CACC security, focuses on V2V CACC (8, 9) . The utility of V2I CACC is largely limited to CACC as a means to reduce environmental impact of traffic (7, 10) . Even in works that utilize V2I CACC, there is limited communication between the connected vehicles and the vehicular infrastructure. It can be argued that in the presence of a potent vehicular network, the infrastructure could play a more active role in assisting with the operations required by vehicular applications. The overarching aim of this work is to present a use case for the benefit to CACC through higher involvement of infrastructure in their standard operation. We present a security strategy that utilizes V2I communication between the system edge and the leader vehicle in CACC to successfully detect an attack on the CACC platoon. Preliminary evaluation of this strategy is presented through a ns-3 based model of a vehicular network that supports a CACC platoon and initiates a DoS attack.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related work section provides an overview of recent work in the V2I and V2V CACC domain. Vehicular system and CACC model section discusses the system model and the CACC application model required for the security strategy. Security strategy for CACC section is discussed in the next section. Analysis and results section presents the ns-3 simulation-based evaluation model and results. Conclusions and future work section conclude the paper.
RELATED WORK
Recent works in the CACC domain were studied to understand the trends in utilization of V2V and V2I/I2V variants of CACC. Works relating to security in CACC were also studied to create an attack model for evaluation of the presented security strategy. This section provides a summary of the studied works.
In Askari et al. (11) and Lioris et al. (12) , the authors study the mobility impact of using CACC on signalized intersections. In Lioris et al. (12) , the authors use CACC platoon formation as a method of increasing throughput of a signalized intersection. The argument this work provides is that platooning the vehicles can double or triple the saturation flow rate and the intersection capacity. The authors use three queuing models of increasing complexity to mathematically analyze this argument and arrive at the following conclusions: the platooning mechanism in CACC reduces vehicle headway and increases saturation flow rate; and, the road network can support an increased traffic demand by the same factor by which the saturation flow rate in increased without causing increased travel time or a queuing delay (12) . While the increased traffic demand leads to longer queues, shortening the signal cycle time by the same factor as the increase in saturation flow rate reduces the queue length and restore linear growth by the said factor. Evaluation of this argument is also provided in the form of simulation results based on a road network with 16 intersections connected through 73 links. While this work only considers the limiting case where 100% penetration of CACC is assumed, Askari et al. (11) augment this work by doing a simulation-based study of scenarios with 0, 25, 50, and 75 percent penetration rate of CACC. This work concludes that a 50% rate of penetration can be responsible to 24-44% increase in intersection throughput, and is responsible for lowering the average travel time for both CACC equipped vehicles and ordinary vehicles.
Work done in Yang et al. (7) and Malakorn et al. (10) presents enhancements to CACC for increasing fuel efficiency. Both works utilize smart signal controllers capable of communicating with the CACC platoon and sending an advisory speed that minimizes traffic events that cause higher fuel consumption. The authors in Yang et al. (7) enhance CACC to eco-cooperative cruise control (Eco-CACC) in an attempt to increase fuel efficiency of vehicles and reduce the environmental impact of traffic. The authors argue that fuel efficiency of vehicles traveling on arterial roads can be increased by minimizing vehicle idling time, sudden acceleration, and stop-and-go maneuvers. Using the signal phase and timing (SPaT) information from signal controllers and vehicle queuing information, Eco-CACC algorithm provides equipped vehicles with one of the two actions: to continue at free-flow speed if the signal controller determines that the speed is sufficient to pass through the intersection while the indicator is green; or to lower speed limit to an advisory speed provided by the signal controller otherwise. The objective in both cases is to ensure that the vehicle requires minimum stopping or idling time. A simulation based analysis of the Eco-CACC algorithm showed that this algorithm is successful in reducing events that decreased fuel efficiency. While V2I communication for CACC is utilized in (7, 10, 11, 12) , the interaction is limited to receiving SPaT information from a smart signal controller.
Works such as van der Heijden et al. (8) and Alipour-Fanid et al. (9) study attack models for CACC and provide methods of quantifying the attack impact. In van der Heijden et al. (8) , the authors aim to study the impact of two types of attacks, jamming attacks and data manipulation attacks, on different types of CACC controllers. A controller is the component implemented in each CACC equipped vehicle to determine the acceleration required to maintain CACC. In this work, controllers with constant spacing, graceful degradation, and consensus controllers are studied. The authors identify two attack goals for attacks on CACC as causing crashes, and destabilizing the CACC platoon. The impact velocity is used to quantify crash impact, and the maximum spacing error between any two nodes in the platoon in one simulation run of CACC is used to determine impact of destabilizing the platoon.
Results from this work demonstrate how each of the studied controllers perform under both attacks and conclude that while the constant degradation controller performs better under a jamming attack, the consensus controller provides the most resilience while mitigating a data injection attack. In Alipour-Fanid et al. (9), the authors analyze the string stability of the platoon in the face of a jamming attack and examine the stability impact of the attacker location with respect to the platoon. While the jamming attack analysis is similar to van der Heijden et al. (8), an additional result from this work determines that maximum destabilization is causes when the jammer is placed above the second vehicle in the platoon, and the stability impact reduces as the attacker progresses down the platoon. Both of these studies use V2V CACC.
VEHICULAR SYSTEM AND CACC MODEL
This section discusses the vehicular system and CACC application model considered for effective utilization of V2I and I2V communication for CACC.
Vehicular System Model
This paper focuses on a vehicular system model more relevant to an arterial network in an urban environment. The components that make up the vehicular network can be categorized as onroad components, and infrastructural components. On-road components include on-board units and sensors on vehicles and are responsible for V2V communication. Infrastructural components include roadside units, signal controllers, and roadside sensors and are responsible for V2I and I2V communication. Each of these components are described below.
1. On-board Unit (OBU)-The OBU is deployed in the vehicle and is capable of sending a vehicle's speed, positional, and relevant application specific data through an available communication technology, and of receiving incoming messages from other capable devices within the communication range.
Roadside Unit (RSU)-
The RSU is deployed as a part of the network edge for vehicular networks. Its function is to engage the OBU to get vehicular information required by CVT applications. Depending on the architectural design, the RSU might further connect to a network of nodes with computational resources to perform application specific tasks and return results in the form of advisory messages that the RSU can communicate to the OBU. The deployment of RSUs along the arterial road is strategically done to ensure uninterrupted connectivity for connected vehicles. 
CACC Application Model
CACC is a vehicle speed control system design that works towards minimizing the distance at which consecutive vehicles can follow one another while ensuring driver safety. Vehicles that participate in CACC are collectively referred to as a CACC platoon. The first vehicle in the platoon is designated the leader while the remainder of the platoon consists of followers. CACC works on the principle of reducing headway between vehicles in the platoon. Headway between two consecutive vehicles is defined as the time between both those vehicles passing the same physical point on a road. The desired headway is determined using either a Constant Time Gap (CTG) or a Constant Distance Gap (CDG) vehicle following model. Typical CACC implementation is the works studied for this paper were done with CTG vehicle following citing higher stability. Overall, it suffices to say that CACC operations are predominantly V2V communication based. Certain operational enhancements within CACC are required to allow beneficial utilization of V2I and I2V communication. Firstly, the leader vehicle should be able to communicate with all the followers in the platoon. This communication will allow the leader to obtain comprehensive knowledge about the platoon and store historical data about platoon behavior such as the headway, inter-vehicle distance, speed, or acceleration profile for individual vehicles in the platoon. This information can be shared by the leader vehicle with the system edge to educate them about platoon behavior. There are two limiting factors to this feature. First, the leader vehicle can only communicate with the entire platoon as long as the platoon length is less than the leader vehicle's DSRC range. Second, there is an upper bound to the volume of historical information the leader vehicle can store dependent on device memory restrictions. It can be hypothesized that a more evolved albeit complicated CACC application might be able to circumvent both these factors. For simplicity, this paper only operates within the bounds of the limiting factors. Additionally, the leader vehicle and system edge should have two distinct exchanges of information; when the platoon comes within the system edge's communication range, and when it exits the communication range. The first communication is for the leader vehicle to share the platoon behavior profile with the system edge, and the second is for the system edge to communicate any advisory messages based on its analysis to the leader vehicle. Figure 1 shows the flow of communication within the CACC platoon and with the system edge. Although it is evident from the nature of the BSM, it should be pointed out for clarity that the system edge will also receive individual BSMs being transmitted from following vehicles in the CACC platoon.
SECURITY STRATEGY FOR CACC
In this section, we discuss the security strategy to detect security attacks in CACC using V2I and I2V communication, and the attack model used for evaluation of the strategy
Attack Model
Recent work in the CACC security domain quantifies attacks of interest to CACC platoons into two broad categories, misbehavior detection and data injection attacks Heijden et al. (15) .The attack considered for this work, denial-of-service (DoS) attack, is a subset of misbehavior detection. There are numerous ways of initiating a DoS attack on a CACC platoon. For the purpose of this work, we consider a DoS attack initiated through flooding. The attacker in this attack sends legitimate BSMs at a higher rate than the vehicles in the CACC platoon with the objective of saturating the channel capacity resulting in denial of service for legitimate traffic. An assumption about the attacker is that it is an authenticated and authorized connected vehicle with access to legitimate security certificates required to disseminate messages. Moreover, altering of messages between the on-road vehicles and system edge are not within the scope of the attack. It can also be assumed from Heijden et al. (15) that the attacking vehicle cannot be the leader car since the leader car has complete control of the platoon and an attack on the leader car would not be a realistic measure of the impact of the attack.
Attack Detection Strategy
The attack strategy being considered in this work is infrastructure dominant and will utilize the CACC leader's communication with the system edge. As a CACC platoon enters the range of a system edge, it receives the CACC behavioral profile from the leader vehicle (f low1) and individual BSMs from each RSU in its range (f low2).
The system edge can utilize the behavioral profile to compare the expected behavioral metrics statistically computed from (f low1) to the actual behavioral metrics obtained from (f low2). We define the set of behavioral metrics as one containing each vehicle V i 's acceleration, speed, or inter-vehicle distance information over a time period T . Inter-vehicle distance is referred to as the distance between the current vehicle and its predecessor. Expected behavioral metric values can be quantified as the range of expected values per vehicle for each metric denoted as {min metric , max metric }. We use the statistical dispersion measurement of the interquartile range (IQR) to find this range. IQR is the range of values between the 25th and 75th percentile of the available data. We argue that if the observed behavioral metric value lies within this range, then an attack is either not present or has trivial impact. As in Islam et al. (16) , we formulate a set of policy rules that can be utilized by the system edge to form attack detection decisions. The policy rules are as follows.
1. Each vehicle in the CACC platoon will broadcast BMSs at rate no higher than σR1 where R1 is the rate of broadcasting and σ is a constant dependent on traffic conditions. The system edge will receive BSMs at a rate no higher than σR1.
2. The behavioral metric value for vehicle i,bm i must belong to the IQR range {min bm , max bm } calculated from the behavioral metric profile.
While policy rule 2 is helpful in asserting abnormal behavior by nodes in a CACC platoon, it does not make any distinction about the reason for this behavior. In a vehicular environment, the observed behavior due to a DoS attack could be similar to the behavior observed in high traffic situations. For confident DoS attack detection, the system edge needs to ensure that policy set {1,2} is violated. We demonstrate this strategy using an example metric of inter-vehicle distance in section 5.
SECURITY STRATEGY EVALUATION
The objective behind the preliminary evaluation is to illustrate the security strategy discussed earlier with an example attack. In this section, we discuss and present simulation results showing the impact of a DoS attack on a CACC platoon. We then use this attack to illustrate the security strategy discussed for attack detection, and discuss attack mitigation possibilities.
CACC Simulation
A simplified model of CACC platoon used for the ns-3 model is given in figure 2 . The platoon consists of a series of vehicles of different dynamics creating a chain supported by wireless communication and visual sensors. The wireless communication between vehicles in a platoon is DSRC 802.11p standard consisting of 4.9 GHz frequency spectrum with OFDM and CSMA mac protocol. The modeling process consisted of creating a given number of mobile nodes (vehicles) equipped with DSRC radio technologies and capable of functioning as CACC enabled vehicles. All the nodes in the simulation were designed to broadcast at a given rate known as BSM broadcast rate. Also, the rate at which individual nodes calculate the required acceleration was designed to be independent of the rate at which BSMs are received and processed.
For simplicity, we assume a CACC platoon of m vehicles with each participating vehicle equipped with DSRC wireless communication devices. The time between consecutive broadcasts from any vehicle in the platoon V i is Γ and the rate of transmission is R b .The time between consecutive vehicle mobility update (new speed/acceleration) based on calculations resulting from the platooning application such as CACC is defined as τ where τ = Γ. The standstill distance between two vehicles is defined as d s top and the time headway is defined as h seconds. The velocity and acceleration of i + 1 th vehicle, V i+1 , is given as {v i+1 , a i+1 } whereas the velocity and acceleration received from vehicle in front of it V i is defined as {v i , a i }. At time t, CACC calculations provide the acceleration to be reached by the vehicle at time t + τ . 
Where a i (t) is the most recent acceleration update from the preceding vehicle v i at time t. Similarly, a i+1 (t) and a i+1 (t+τ ) are acceleration of vehicle V i+1 at time t and required acceleration at future time t + τ respectively. 
A pseudo code of the methodical process for CACC is given in Algorithm 1. A 10-vehicle platoon with an applied data rate of 40 kbps was simulated using the method described above for a total simulation time of 20s per simulation. Each BSM sent was of size 200 Bytes. Additionally, the headway between vehicles is selected to be 1s.
DoS Attack Simulation
The DoS attack is initiated by a malicious vehicle outside the CACC platoon. This vehicle has access to the same communication channel as the platoon and can send BSM packets at a rate greater than the packet rate being utilized by the platoon. The objective of the malicious node in this attack is to saturate the communication channel and cause a delay in V2V communication in the CACC platoon. Within the CACC platoon, this delay manifests itself as BSM packets not being received in time. Thus, incorrect acceleration value are calculated by the vehicles leading to string instability. To simulate this attack, an additional node is added to the CACC model placed as the last node in the simulated CACC platoon. This node is set up to send broadcast messages at a higher rate than the CACC BSM sending rate. Four different simulation runs are conducted with different sending rates for the malicious node to better understand the full scope the DoS attacks impact. Table 1 shows the exhaustive list of attack scenarios for the attack. BSMs Rate in the table refers to the transmission rate per packet and the malicious and CACC nodes are denoted using mal and CACC respectively.
Attack Detection Setup
The security strategy incoming information from two sources-the CACC behavioral profile from the leader vehicle, and the individual BSMs from the rest of the CACC platoon. The system 
if newacc ≤ minacc then newacc ← minacc 6: end if 7: if newacc ≥ maxacc then newacc ← maxacc 8: end if 9: distance to travel ← f (newacc, τ ) edge is modeled within the ns-3 environment as a stationary node placed in the path of the CACC platoon. The leader vehicle transmitted the CACC behavioral profile to this node. The CACC behavioral profile is a log of data being stored at the leader node that contains BSMs from each of the follower vehicles. Information present in each BSM includes the vehicle's unique ID, timestamp of sending the BSM, acceleration, speed, current position, and distance from preceding vehicle. The unique ID for each vehicle is a numerical index value assigned to it. The time-stamp is defined as time since the start of simulation and expressed in microseconds. The position is expressed in Cartesian coordinates. While we have hypothesized that the system edge should be able to statistically form a behavior profile from the data transmitted by the leader vehicle, an offline statistical analysis on the data file received at the system edge is conducted for the purpose of illustration. Thus, a behavioral profile showing a statistical summary of a behavioral metric for each vehicle in the platoon was formed. Table 3 shows the behavioral profile formed for the metric inter-vehicle distance quantified as 
Evaluation Metrics
Certain evaluation metrics were used for quantifying the attack impact and detection. An important indicator of the impact is the distance error value,e i , indicates the difference between observed distance between two consecutive vehicles and the expected distance according to CACC (15) . With the delay in BSMs communicating the vehicle's acceleration values in the platoon, the e i is expected to increase. Instability in the CACC platoon can further be quantified using the maximum e i value observed for each vehicle over the entire simulation run. Since the distance error can be positive when d i > d r,i and negative when d i < d r,i , an absolute value of e i is considered for evaluation. Thus, the metric considered for quantification of attack impact is max(|e i |). max(|e i |) represents the maximum distance error observed for each vehicle within the CACC platoon over time t. avg|(e i )| plotted over the simulation time T is used to show the propagation of the attack with time. Time T is the difference between the start and end of the simulation, t start and t stop respectively. The observed inter-vehicle distance,d r,i , is utilized as the metric for attack detection. d r,i is preferred over e i for attack mitigation due to its ease of access by the system edge through BSMs from the CACC platoon. A statistical range defined using observed d r,i values is also used for behavior comparison as discussed earlier. Table 3 provides a key for all evaluation metrics used in this study. Figure 3 shows the maximum distance error value observed for each vehicle in the CACC platoon. The graph plots observed max|(e i )| values against the vehicle they are observed for. The high distance error observed for vehicle 1 can be explained by the way the simulation is setup. The acceleration profile of the leader vehicle is set to be linearly increasing by a factor of 0.025 f t/s 2 at each step of the simulation while the acceleration of follower vehicles is first calculated by the CACC model and bounded to represent a realistic acceleration behavior. This peculiar behavior can be disregarded as it is similar for all attacks and baseline scenarios.The baseline was obtained by running the CACC platoon without the presence of the attack node and observing the maximum absolute distance error values for each vehicle over the entire simulation. One of the criteria for string stability analysis in CACC platoons pertains to the trend in which maximum absolute distance error between two consecutive vehicles decreases. At any give instance of time during the simulation, the absolute distance error should be decreasing towards the tail of the platoon. We found the baseline data to validate that requirement which supported the stability condition for the baseline simulations. In comparison to the baseline values for max|(e i )| in figure 3 , higher values of max|(e i )| are observed for all attack scenarios as expected. Moreover, it can be deduced from figure 4 that the average distance error value for each time step in the simulation increases for attack scenarios (2a), (2b), (2c), and (2d). This is indicative of instability in the CACC platoon as the simulation time increases and shows that DoS attack can destabilize the CACC string. This result is in keeping with DoS attack impact observed in (9) . Table 3 shows the empirical evidence for the successful implementation of the security strategy. As stated earlier, columns d r,i min , d r,i q1 , d r,i med , d r,i mean , d r,i q3 , and d r,i max show the min-imum, first quartile, median, mean, third quartile, and maximum value of inter-vehicle distance for each vehicle obtained over the entire run of simulation. The acceptable range for inter-vehicle distance for each vehicle is {d r,i q1 , d r,i q3 }. Considering an illustrative example where the system edge has access to this behavioral profile, we trivially compute the mean value of d r,i observed for each vehicle i at the system edge. The observed mean inter-vehicle distance from each vehicle's BSMs are shown in columns (2a), (2b), (2c), and (2d) that reflect DoS attack scenarios describes in table 1. It should be noted that for the purpose of demonstration of this strategy, the BSMs were taken at t = 14s where total simulation time T was 20s. It can be substantiated from figure 4 that the impact of the DoS attack is evident at this point in the simulation. From the values for inter-vehicle distance observed from each vehicle and the inter-quartile range for acceptable values discussed above, the table shows that the system edge could successfully identify nodes 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 as nodes violating policy rule 2. Additionally, since experiments 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), and 2(d) have a malicious node with a transmitting rate of 2 × R1, 4 × R1, 8 × 1, and 10 × R1 respectively, the system edge would be able to confirm that policy rule 1 is being violated. Thus, with confirmation of the policy set {1,2}, the system edge can confidently detect the attack. This information can be substantiated by figure 3 as well where nodes 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 show a higher value of max|(e i )| as compared to nodes 1, 2, 3, and 4. As a result of observing anomalous behavior, the system edge could follow guidelines set by the rule described in section 4 and send an advisory message alerting anomalous behavior detection to the leader vehicle. A possible mitigation measure following successful detection could be similar to the work done in (16) . In this work, the authors discuss a mitigation measure where the system edge can quarantine the attacker node upon detection and provide corrective information to the impacted nodes to maintain steady information flow. Relating to the CACC platoon in this example, the leader vehicle could accept the advisory message sent by the system edge and allow the system edge to advise the nodes with anomalous behavior of corrective inter-vehicle distances. 
Analysis and Results

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we put forth the proposition that higher utilization of infrastructural support within functioning of CACC will add greater value to the application. Using a crucial aspect of CACC, security with the CACC platoon, we illustrates through empirical evidence how the system edge in a vehicular network could be utilized to successfully perform an attack detection mechanism on a CACC platoon under the influence of a DoS attack. Additionally, we were able to corroborate the string destabilizing impact of a DoS attack on a platoon. While empirical evidence of the proposed security strategy is the preliminary step towards determining the merit of this strategy, practical implementation would require additional rigorous evaluation. We intend to follow this work with a rigorous two part evaluation of the security strategy consisting of further simulation based evaluation using different attack models and information flow logistics; and, validation of obtained results against real time results obtained from the physical vehicular network testbed deployed at Clemson University. Additionally, we plan to augment this strategy with an attack mitigation measure to form a more comprehensive security solution.
